Jonathan S. Phillips

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EMPLOYMENT

Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
Program in Cognitive Science
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
Department of Philosophy

  Assistant Professor   **2019- present**

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Department of Psychology

  Postdoctoral Fellow   **2015-2019**

EDUCATION

Yale University, New Haven, CT
Department of Psychology
Department of Philosophy

  Ph.D., Philosophy and Psychology   **2010-2015**

University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC
Department of Philosophy

  B.A., Philosophy, Summa Cum Laude
  Highest Honors in Philosophy   **2005-2008**

PAPERS UNDER REVISION

Phillips, J. & Kratzer, A. (*under revised review*) Decomposing modal thought. *Psychological Review*
Draft: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/g6tzc

Bernhard, R., Cushman, F., Cameron, A., & **Phillips, J.** (*under revision*). The neural instantiation of spontaneous counterfactual thought. *JEP:G*
Draft: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/zdf2w

IN PRESS & PUBLISHED PAPERS

Phillips, J. & Plunkett, D. (*in press*). How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's 'Core Capacity Thesis' and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences. *Journal of Applied Philosophy.*

Phillips, J. & Plunkett, D. (2023). Are there really any dual-character concepts? *Philosophical Perspectives, 37*: 340369.

Mills, T. & **Phillips, J.** (2023) Locating what comes to mind in empirically derived representational spaces. *Cognition, 240.*

Handley-Miner, I., Pope, M., Atkins, R., Jones-Jang, S., McKaughan, D., **Phillips, J.**, & Young, L. (2023). The intentions of information sources can affect what information people think qualifies as true. *Scientific Reports, 13*: 7718.

Kirfel, L. & **Phillips, J.** (2023) The pervasive impact of ignorance. *Cognition, 231.*

Acierno, J., Mischel, S., & **Phillips, J.** (2022) Moral judgments reflect default representations of possibility. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B, 377*: 2021034120210341.

Bernhard, R., LeBaron, H., & **Phillips, J.** (2022) It's not what you did, it's what you could have done. *Cognition, 228.*

Phillips, J., Buckwalter, W., Cushman, F., Friedman, O., Martin, A., Turri, J., Santos, L., & Knobe, J. (2021) Actual knowledge. Author Rebuttal for "Knowledge before Belief" in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 44.*

Phillips, J., Buckwalter, W., Cushman, F., Friedman, O., Martin, A., Turri, J., Santos, L., & Knobe, J. (2021) Knowledge before belief. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 44*, e140.

Morris, A., **Phillips, J.**, Huang, K., & Cushman, F. (2021) Generating options and choosing between them rely on distinct forms of value representation. *Psychological Science.*

Phillips, J. & Norby, A. (2021) Factive theory of mind. *Mind & Language*, 36, 3-26.

Cova, F., Strickland, B., ... **Phillips, J.**, et al., (2021) Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology.* 21(1): 9-44.

Phillips, J. & Mandelkern, M. (2020. Eavesdropping: What is it good for? *Semantics & Pragmatics,* 13(19): 1-31.

Phillips, J., Morris, A., & Cushman, F. (2019) How we know what not to think. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 23(12), 1026-1040.

Kominsky, J. & **Phillips, J.** (2019) Immoral professors and malfunctioning tools: Counterfactual relevance accounts explain the effect of norm violations on causal selection. *Cognitive Science*, 43: e12792.

Morris, A., **Phillips, J.**, Gerstenberg, T., & Cushman, F. (2019) Quantitative causal selection patterns in token causation. *PLoS ONE* 14(8), e0219704.

Shtulman A. & **Phillips, J.** (2018) Differentiating *could* from *should*: Developmental changes in modal cognition. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 165: 161-182.

Phillips, J. & George, B.R. (2018) Knowledge *wh* and false beliefs: Experimental investigations. *Journal of Semantics*, 35(3), 467-494.

Phillips, J. & Knobe, J. (2018) The psychological representation of modality. *Mind & Language*, 33: 65-94.

Khoo, J. & **Phillips, J.** (2018) New horizons for a theory of epistemic modals. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 97(2), 309-324.

Phillips, J. & Cushman, F. (2017) Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 114(18): 4649-4654.

Phillips, J., De Freitas J., Mott, C., Gruber, J. & Knobe, J. (2017) True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 146(2): 165-181.

Phillips, J., Luguri, J. & Knobe, J. (2015) Unifying morality's influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities. *Cognition*, 145: 30-42.

Phillips, J., Ong, D.C., Surtees, A.D.R., Xin, Y., Williams, S., Saxe, R. & Frank, M. C. (2015) A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering Kovcs, Tgls, and Endress (2010). *Psychological Science*, 26(9): 1353-1367

Kominsky, J. F., **Phillips, J.**, Gerstenberg, T., Lagnado, D., & Knobe, J. (2015) Causal superseding. *Cognition*, 137: 196-209.

Phillips, J., Nyholm, S. & Liao, S. (2014) The good in happiness. In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1.* Oxford University Press. 253-293.

Phillips, J. & Shaw, A. (2014) Manipulating morality: Third-party intentions alter moral judgments by changing causal reasoning. *Cognitive Science.* 39(6): 1320-1347

Phillips, J., Misenheimer, L., & Knobe, J. (2011) The Ordinary Concept of Happiness (and others like it). *Emotion Review.* 3(3): 1-3.

Young, L. & **Phillips, J.** (2011) The Paradox of Moral Focus. *Cognition.* 119(2): 166-178.

Phillips, J. & Knobe, J. (2009) Moral Judgments and Intuitions about Freedom. *Psychological Inquiry.* 20(1): 30-36.

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Gonzalez, B., Gerstenberg, T., & **Phillips, J.** (2023). Causal Reasoning Across Agents and Objects. *Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Kwon, M., Wager, T., & **Phillips, J.** (2022). Representations of emotion concepts: Comparison across pairwise, appraisal feature-based, and word embedding-based similarity spaces. *Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Mills, T. & **Phillips, J.** (2022). What comes to mind? Samples from relevance-based feature spaces. *Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Ocampo, J. & **Phillips, J.** (2022). Consent and the Doctrine of Double Effect. *Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Srinivasan, G., Acierno, J. & **Phillips, J.** (2022). The shape of option generation in open-ended decision problems. *Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Shin, S., Holland, C. & **Phillips, J.** (2021). Do you see what I see? A meta-analysis of the Dot Perspective Task. *Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*

Kirfel, L. & **Phillips, J.** (2021). The impact of ignorance beyond causation: An experimental meta-analysis. *Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*

Scherer, H. & **Phillips, J.** (2021). Top-down effects of anthropomorphism of a robot. *Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*

Holland, C., & **Phillips, J.** (2020). A theoretically driven meta-analysis of implicit theory of mind studies: The role of factivity. *Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*

Morris, A., **Phillips, J.**, & Cushman, F. (2018). Value-guided choice sets support efficient planning. *Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Phllips, J., Strickland, B., Armary, P., Knobe, J. & Cushman, F. (2018) Evidence for evaluations of knowledge prior to belief. *Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Phillips, J. & Mandelkern, M. (2018) Sticky situations: *Force* and quantifier domains. *Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory*

Phillips, J. & Kominsky, K. (2017) Causation and norms of proper functioning: Counterfactuals are (still) relevant. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Phillips, J. & Cushman, F. (2016) Multiple Systems for Modal Cognition. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Phillips, J., Knobe, J., Shtulman, S., Kalish, C., Riggs, A. & Hitchcock, C. (2015) The relevance of alternative possibilities throughout cognition. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Kominsky, J., Gerstenberg, T., **Phillips, J.**, Lagnado, D. & Knobe, J. (2014) Causal supersession. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Ullman, D., Leite, I., **Phillips, J.**, Kim-Cohen, J., & Scassellati, B. (2014) Smart human, smarter robot: How cheating affects perceptions of social agency. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

Phillips, J. & Young, L. (2011) Apparent paradoxes in moral reasoning; Or how you forced him to do it, even though he wasn't forced to do it. *Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.*

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Hecht, E., Mills, T., Shin, S. & **Phillips, J.** (2022). Not so rational: A more natural way to understand the ANS. Commentary on S. Clarke and J. Beck (2022) The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*

Bear, A., & **Phillips, J.** (2022). Random Effects Wont Solve the Problem of Generalizability. Commentary on Yarkoni, T. (2022). The Generalizability Crisis. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences.*

Doris, J., Stich, S., **Phillips, J**, & Lachlan, D.W. (2017) Moral psychology: Empirical approaches. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

GRANTS

Dartmouth Experimental Learning Initiative Course Small Grant (2022)

Conscious Control in Choice Set Generation - with Regan Bernhard and Adina Roskies, winner of the Worldwide Competition in the Neurophilosophy of Free Will (2021)

The Neural Representation of Counterfactual Thought - funded by the John Templeton Foundation through Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (2019)

Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-14-1-0800 written with and submitted by Fiery Cushman (PI)

Harvard Mind Brain and Behavior Post Doctoral Fellow Research Grant (2018-2019)

Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study Exploratory Seminar: 'What is good and what is possible: Searching for an Interdisciplinary Language' (2018 - 2019)

Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-14-1-0800 written with and submitted by Fiery Cushman (PI)

HONORS AND AWARDS	Fellowship, Center for Advanced Studies, "Human Abilities", Humbolt Universität	2022
	Stanton Award Award, Society for Philosophy and Psychology	2021
	Rising Star, Association for Psychological Science	2021
	Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy Fellow	2018-2019
	SIAS Summer Institute Fellow: *The Investigation of Linguistic Meaning*	2015-2016
	The Fredric Woodrow Knapp Fellowship Fund, Yale	2015
	William Kessen Teaching Award, Yale	2013
	Highest Honors in Philosophy, UNC-Chapel Hill	2008

INVITED TALKS 2019-PRESENT

Decomposing modal thought *MindCORE Seminar Series*, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA (*upcoming*).

Modal spaces as a foundation for high-level cognition. *Cognitive Brown Bag*, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (*2023*).

Knowledge without belief. *Cognitive Science Colloquium*, Central European University, Vienna, Austria. (2023).

Decomposing modal thought. *Department of Psychology Colloquium*, University of Göttingen. Göttingen, Germany (2022).

Decomposing modal thought. *New York Philosophy of Language Workshop.* New York, NY (2022).

Knowledge before belief. *Decoupling and Mentalizing Workshop.* Collège de France, Paris, France (2022).

The shape of option generation. *Psychological and Brain Sciences Colloquium.* Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD (2022).

Modal spaces as a foundation for high-level cognition. *Formal and Experimental Philosophy 2.* University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA (2022).

Decomposing modal thought. *Philosophy and Linguistics Workshop.* Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (2022).

Unifying modal thought and talk. *Naturalised Epistemologies of Modality* Center for Advanced Studies in Humanities, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany (2022).

Actual knowledge. *Workshop on Understanding Others Factively*. Technical University Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany (2022).

Modal backgrounds *Philosophical Psychology Group* Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL (2022).

Epistemic modal thought. *Language & Cognition*, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (2021).

Modal thought. Stanton Prize Address, *Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ (2021)

Knowledge before belief. *European Society for Philosophy and Psychology*, University of Leipzig, Germany (2021)

How we know what not to think. *Cognitive Workshop*, Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL. (2021)

Knowledge before belief. *Mind & Language Series*, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA. (2021)

Knowledge before belief. *Mind and Moral Psychology Working Group*, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (2021)

Knowledge before belief. Keynote Address, *Kinds of Mindreading*, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT. (2020)

Decomposing modal thought. *Cognitive Development Seminar*, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. (2020)

Minimal modal cognition. *Laboratory for Developmental Studies*, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. (2020)

A bridge from the semantics to the psychology of modality. *Experiments in Linguistic Meaning* conference, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA (2020)

How we know what not to think. *Logic of Conceivability Group*, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands (2020)

Practical Worlds: How value and probability constrain modal thought. *Endless possibilities: The development of possibility and necessity in cognition, language, and society*, University of Maryland, College Park, MD (2019)

Practical Worlds: How practical value shapes the generation of possible actions. *Workshop on X-Phi and Normativity*, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia (2019)

Epistemic Modals. *All Souls College*, Oxford University, Oxford, UK (2019)

The psychological representation of modality. *University College London*, London, UK (2019)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES	Member of the Moral Psychology Research Group (2012-present)
	Program committee for Experiments in Linguistic Meaning (2020-2022)
	Program chair for the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2016)

Steering Committee for the Postdoctoral portion of Harvard's Mind Brain and Behavior (MBB) Initiative (2015-2016)

Executive Committee member of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2012-2015)

Ad hoc reviewer for *Child Development, Cognition, Cognitive Development, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Erkenntnis, Ergo, Frontiers in Psychology, International Journal of Psychology, JEP:General, JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Semantics, Linguistics and Philosophy, Mind & Language, The Monist, National Science Center, Poland, Natural Language Semantics, Open Mind, Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Psychological Science, Perspectives on Psychological Science, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Philosophical Psychology, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Semantics and Pragmatics, Synthese, Trends in Cognitive Science*

COURSES INSTRUCTED	**Dartmouth College**	
	Introduction to Cognitive Science	2019-2023
	Major Seminar in Cognitive Science	2019-2023
	Mind, Language, and Morality	2020-2022
	Philosophy of Cognitive Science	2020

PH.D. STUDENTS	Catherine Holland	2019 - present
	Mijin Kwon	2020 - present
	Era Wu	2021 - present
	Alina Drachevna	2021 - present
	Bryan Gonzalez	Graduated 2023

POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWS	Regan Bernhard	2021 - 2022